Embracing Failure: Availability via Repair-centric Design

Aaron Brown

Qualifying Examination 13 April 2001

Contributions

- New philosophy for high-availability design
- Definition of repair-centric design techniques - addressing hardware, software, and human failures
- Prototype repair-centric system implementation
- Quantitative, human-aware availability evaluation methodology
 - including collection and characterization of data on real-world system failure modes and maintenance tasks

Outline

- Grand vision: repair-centric design philosophy
- Research and implementation plan
- \cdot Evaluation plan
- Summary and timeline

Motivation for a new philosophy

• Internet service availability is a big concern

- outages are frequent
 - » 65% of IT managers report that their websites were unavailable to customers over a 6-month period
 - 25%: 3 or more outages
- outages costs are high
 - » NYC stockbroker: \$6,500,000/hr
 - » EBay: \$ 225,000/hr
 - » Amazon.com: \$ 180,000/hr
 - » social effects: negative press, loss of customers who "click over" to competitor
- but, despite marketing, progress seems slow. . .
- Why?

Traditional HA vs. Internet reality

Traditional HA env't

- stable
 - » functionality
 - » software
 - » workload and scale
- high-quality infrastructure designed for high availability
 - » robust hardware: fail-fast, duplication, error checking
 - » custom, well-tested, single-app software
 - » single-vendor systems
- certified maintenance
 - » phone-home reporting
 - » trained vendor technicians

Internet service env't

- dynamic and evolving
 - » weekly functionality changes
 - » rapid software development
 - » unpredictable workload and fast growth
- commodity infrastructure coerced into high availability
 - » cheap hardware lacking extensive error-checking
 - » poorly-tested software cobbled together from offthe-shelf and custom code
 - » multi-vendor systems
- ad-hoc maintenance
 - » by local or co-lo. techs

Facts of life

• Realities of Internet service environment:

- hardware and software failures are inevitable

- » hardware reliability still imperfect
- » software reliability thwarted by rapid evolution
- » Internet system scale exposes second-order failure modes

- system failure modes cannot be modeled or predicted

- » commodity components do not fail cleanly
- » black-box system design thwarts models
- » unanticipated failures are normal
- human operators are imperfect
 - » human error accounts for ~50% of all system failures
 - » human error probability is 10%-100% under stress

Traditional HA doesn't address these realities!

Repair-centric hypothesis

"If a problem has no solution, it may not be a problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped with over time" — Shimon Peres

- Failures are a fact, and repair is how we cope with them
- Improving repair will improve availability
 availability = MTTF
 (MTTF + MTTR)

Repair-centric systems

• A repair-centric system

- uses repair to tolerate failures of hardware, software, and humans
- provides rapid repair
 - » efficiently detects and diagnoses failures
- provides effective repair
 - » proactively verifies efficacy and speed of repair procedures
- provides robust repair
 - » tolerates errors during repair and maintenance

Context: repair-centric design

• Vs. traditional fault-tolerance approaches

- different philosophy
 - » traditional: focus on HW; assume good software, operators
 - build good SW by controlling development, modeling
 - » repair-centric: assume that any HW, SW, operator can fail
 - assume environment too dynamic to control or model
- some shared techniques
 - » testing, checkpoints, fault-injection, diagnosis
 - » but applied differently: online, system-wide, without models

• Other existing repair-centric approaches

- restartable systems
 - » Recursive Restartability, soft-state worker frameworks
- application-level checkpoint recovery

Outline

- Grand vision: repair-centric design philosophy
- Research and implementation plan
- Evaluation plan
- Summary and timeline

Research Plan

• Evaluate the repair-centric hypothesis by

- identifying repair-centric design techniques
- implementing the design techniques in a prototype
- assessing the resulting availability improvements using availability benchmarks
- Target application: Internet email service


Staged research plan

- addresses practical concerns of scope, new grads
- provides coherent fallback positions

Context: application

• Application: Internet email service

- simple, but enough complexity to be interesting
 - » hard state, rich data, relaxed consistency requirements



- techniques for email should generalize
 - » but stronger consistency may add complexity
- realistic workloads available for email

Context: implementation platform

- Base implementation: NinjaMail
 - research implementation from UCB Ninja group
 - already implements non-repair-centric HA techniques » clustered, replicated, load-balanced, modular, restartable
 - written in Java in the Ninja environment
 - » low-level Ninja mechanisms useful for repair-centric design
 - using existing system increases relevance, saves work

Staged research plan

• Big picture of the stages

- 1) undo: the ultimate repair mechanism
 - » tolerate human error and repair unanticipated failures
- 2) online verification: fully-integrated online testing
 - » detect failures quickly to expedite repair
- 3) exercising repair: online fault-injection
 - » provide trust in repair mechanisms and train operators
- 4) diagnosis: dependency and fault tracking
 - » assist operator in pinpointing failures to expedite repair
- Evaluation can be done after any stage

Stage 1: Undo

Undo definition

- undo restores modified system state to a previous snapshot while preserving externally-initiated updates
 - » i.e., for email, it restores state while preserving mail delivery and user mailbox modifications
- Undo is the most fundamental repair-centric design mechanism
 - provides a way to tolerate human errors
 » undo is ubiquitous in productivity apps
 » should have "undo for maintenance"
 - allows recovery from inevitable HW/SW errors » restore entire system state to pre-error version
 - subsumes traditional backup and restore

Undo examples

Tolerating human maintenance errors

- operator disconnects wrong component during repair
 » undo: replace component, system continues normally
- operator installs software upgrade that corrupts data or performs poorly (E*Trade, EBay)
 - » undo: roll-back upgrade, restore uncorrupted data, replay interim requests
- operator overwrites data store or critical config file » undo: restore data store, config state; replay lost requests

Tolerating failures

- hardware or software failure corrupts data
 w undo: restore snapshot and replay interim requests
- system destabilizes when new hardware is added » undo: revert system configuration state to disable hardware

Undo context

Similar to existing checkpoint techniques...

- file system snapshots (e.g., NetApp)
- DBMS log-based recovery
- application checkpointing for failure recovery
- ... but with some new twists
 - use for tolerating human mistakes
 - use at system level as well as application level
 » mandatory for tolerating errors during repair/maintenance
 - preservation of externally-initiated updates
 - » logging/replay at external interfaces and full state restoration avoid inherent save-work/lose-work conflict

Undo implementation

• As a repair mechanism, undo must be simple

- no complex fine-grained distributed checkpoints, etc.

• Two types of simple undo

1) allow replacement of incorrectly-removed components

 » enforce queuing in front of all removable resources
 » spill queues to disk to allow reasonable replacement window
 » Ninja's queue-based communication model should match well

2) coarse-grained maintenance-undo of system state

- » provide cluster-wide hard state rollback mechanism with preservation of external updates (like mail delivery)
- » leverage properties of email service to simplify implementation

Undo implementation (2)

- Coarse-grained maintenance undo
 - use standard snapshot and logging techniques
 - restrict semantics to simplify implementation
 - » coarse-grained in space: undo affects entire cluster partition
 - » coarse-grained in time: undo rolls back to a previous snapshot
 - » undo restores only system hard-state
 - software, config. files, mail store contents
 - updates preserved by logging and replaying at external interfaces
 - enabled by Ninja design of stateless workers
 - these semantics are sufficient
 - » coarse granularity is appropriate for a repair mechanism
 - » email can tolerate inconsistencies during undo/rollback

Undo issues

- Open issues in implementing undo
 - defining undo points
 - » simplest: a special "undo mode" for tolerating human error
 - » but periodic snapshots are needed for repairing unanticipated failures
 - snapshot and logging mechanisms
 - » overhead affects granularity of undo points
 - » with cheap disks and disk bandwidth, are simple but highoverhead schemes acceptable?
 - protecting undo from failures
 - » snapshots, external request logs must be independent
 - » undo should be tested like any repair mechanism: stage 3

Stage 2: Online verification

• Goal: expedite repair

- expose latent problems for repair
- reduce failure propagation with faster detection

• Techniques

- continuously verify HW & SW component operation
 - » check correctness to detect bugs and hard failures
 - » check performance to detect bottlenecks and soft failures
 - » use real test inputs, not heartbeats
- add verification at all component interfaces
 - » check received data against specifications, checksums
- check global system properties
 - » use "conservation law analysis" as in industrial plants [Lind81] to prevent loss, misdirection of data

Issues in online verification

Standard testing issues

- input selection, result verification, coverage analysis

Online testing challenges

- ensuring non-destructive operation
 - » perform testing on an isolated partition of the cluster
 - » use hardware isolation and existing Ninja partitioning and node-reincorporation mechanisms
- detecting dynamic performance problems
 - » check all tests against running statistical estimates of range of normal performance

Developing global conservation laws for email

 example: rate of incoming messages must equal sum of rates of additions to user mailboxes

Stage 3: Exercising repair

- Repair mechanisms are often untrustworthy
 - buggy automatic recovery code
 - humans unfamiliar with system repair procedures
- Goal: proactively verify repair mechanisms by exercising them in realistic environment
 - detect broken recovery code so it isn't relied on
 - provide framework for testing recovery code
 - familiarize operators with failure modes and repair procedures, and test them
- Basic technique: fault-injection
 - performed in online, production system!

Exercising repair: approach

- Inject realistic faults to simulate failures
 - targeted faults simulate most likely failure modes
 - random faults capture tail of the failure distribution
- Allow automatic recovery attempt
 - if recovery fails or is not available, log fault and use in human exercises

» approach is self-tuning for level of automatic recovery

- Perform human training/testing
 - using fault set that failed automatic recovery
- Do testing on isolated subset of system
 - to avoid damage to production system

Issues in exercising repair

Fault injection

- need realistic fault set and injection harness
- also needed for evaluation -> discussed later

Verification

- straightforward for targeted faults » effects are known
- a challenge for random faults
 - » use stage 2 testing and verification infrastructure

Protection

- use partition-isolation mechanisms from stage 2

Stage 4: Diagnosis aids

- Goal: assist human diagnosis, not subsume it
 - reduce space of possible root causes of failure
 - provide detailed "health status" of all components
- Technique #1: dependency analysis
 - model dependencies of requests on system resources
 - » use model to identify potential resource failures when a request fails
 - » correlate dependencies across symptomatic requests to reduce failure set
 - generate model dynamically
 - » stamp requests with ID of each resource/queue they touch
 - issues
 - » tracking dependencies across decoupling points
 - » accounting for failures in background non-request processing

Diagnosis aids

Technique #2: propagating fault information

- explicitly propagate component failure and recovery information upward
 - » provide "health status" of all components
 - » can attempt to mask symptoms, but still inform upper layers
 - » rely on online verification infrastructure for detection

- issues

- » devising a general representation for health information
- » using health information to let application participate in repair

Outline


- Grand vision: repair-centric design philosophy
- Research and implementation plan
- Evaluation plan
- Summary and timeline

Evaluation plan

- Goal: evaluate overall availability gains from repair-centric design
 - compare modified, repair-centric NinjaMail to stock implementation
- Requires availability benchmarking
 - a technique we developed in earlier work

Availability benchmarking 101

 Availability benchmarks quantify system behavior under failures and maintenance



They require

- a realistic workload for the system
- quality of service metrics and tools to measure them
- fault-injection to simulate failures
- human operators to perform repairs

Availability benchmarks for email

- Workload
 - SPECmail2001 industry-standard email benchmark
- Quality of service metrics
 - performance (SPECmail messages per minute)
 - error rate (lost or corrupted messages and mailboxes)
 - consistency (fraction of inconsistent mailboxes)
 - human maintenance time and error rate

Fault injection

Fault workload

- must accurately reflect failure modes of real-world Internet service environments
 - » plus random tests to increase coverage, simulate Heisenbugs
- but, no existing public failure dataset
 - » we have to collect this data
 - » a challenge due to proprietary nature of data
 - » interest expressed by Microsoft, IBM, and Hotmail
- major contribution will be to collect, anonymize, and publish a modern set of failure data

Fault injection harness


- build into system: needed for stage 3 (exercising repair)

Evaluation: human aspects

- Must include humans in availability benchmarks
 - to verify effectiveness of undo, training, diagnostics
 - humans act as system administrators
- Subjects should be admin-savvy
 - system administrators
 - CS graduate students
- Challenge will be compressing timescale
 - i.e., for evaluating training
- We have some experience with these trials
 - earlier work in maintainability benchmarks used 5person pilot study



- Repair-centric design hypothesis
 - a new approach to increasing availability by focusing on repair
 - based on realities of today's Internet service env't
 - tackles the universally-ignored problem of human error
- Prototyping plan in NinjaMail email service
- Evaluation plan using availability benchmarks
- If successful, a significant contribution to state-of-the-art in high-availability design




- At minimum, committed to:
 - stage 1 (undo) and stage 3 (exercising repair)
 - a partial implementation of stage 2 (online verification)
 - failure data collection
 - availability benchmarking using human trials

End


Human error rate experiments

• Human error rates during simple RAID repair

- 5 trained subjects repeatedly repairing disk failures
- aggregate error rate across subjects plotted over time



What causes un-availability?



Many different factors are involved human behavior during maintenance dominates

Traditional HA vs. repair-centric

Traditional HA system

- hardware-centric focus
- assumes robust software
 - » by controlling entire stack
- assumes robust operator
 » by controlling maintenance
- may not tolerate errors during repair/maintenance

- Repair-centric system
 - tolerates hardware, software, human errors
 - assumes black-box software stack
 - tolerates operator error
 - tolerates errors during maintenance/repair

Assumptions

- Cluster-like environment
 - replicated data and services
 - partitionable hardware
- Single-application system
- Modular HW/SW design
- Availability trumps performance
 - willing to sacrifice performance to increase availability
- Extra resources are available
 - willing to overprovision resources to improve availability
 - » especially inexpensive disks and disk bandwidth

Details: application spectrum

Application	Hard state	Consistency requirement	Interface complexity	Internal knowledge of data semantics	Query complexity	Total
SQL database	3	3	3	3	3	15
E-commerce app. server	0	3	3	3	3	12
Email	3	1	1	2	2	9
File server	3	2	1	1	1	8
Search engine	1	1	0	3	2	7
Block server	3	2	0	0	0	5
Transforming proxy	0	0	0	3	1	4
Web server	1	1	0	1	0	3

Context: undo

\cdot Undo is common for application recovery

- database transaction rollback
- checkpoint/restore of long-running scientific codes
- app. checkpointing may help tolerate Heisenbugs
- But is rare at the system level
 - only common example is snapshotting file systems » Network Appliance, new BSD FFS, Elephant, etc.
 - system-level undo needed to handle maintenance errors
- Implementing undo requires implementing standard recovery techniques at system level

- checkpointing, logging, snapshots, ...

Context: exercising repair

- Similar to traditional "fire-drill" testing
 - but automated, so it really gets done
 - unique to perform testing in context of live system using fault-injection
- Training aspect is similar to offline training
 - Tandem's "uptime champion" uses pilot-system-trained operators to increase availability
 - aircraft industry has long-standing tradition of simulator-based training to reduce human error
 - our approach provides same, but on live system
- Built-in fault injection similar to mainframes
 - IBM 3090, ES/9000 used built-in fault injection, but only during test-floor burn-in

Sources: Bartlett01, Merenda92, Nawrocki81

Context: online verification

- Most existing approaches are in hardware
 - lockstep hardware in mainframe and FT systems
 - ECC and other hardware verification schemes
 - hardware Built-In-Self-Test (BIST), online & offline
- Online software techniques are usually ad-hoc
 - assertion checking
 - heartbeats
 - checksums

We systematically extend hardware techniques to software and system level

Context: diagnosis

• One-off system-specific diagnosis aids

- NetApp network diagnoser: cross-layer correlation and expert-system approaches
- General diagnostic methods
 - expert systems and fault-tree approaches
 - » all require good understanding/model of failure modes, and thus conflict with real-world observations
 - dependency-based root-cause analysis
 - » requires system model, but only at level of resource dependencies
 - » our request-tracing approach dynamically discovers resource dependency model


What we're NOT trying to do

- Invent new recovery mechanisms for NinjaMail
 orthogonal
- Remove the human operator from the loop - unrealistic. But we can maybe simplify their job.
- Eliminate human errors completely
 - impossible
- Guarantee fault detection, fail-stop behavior
 - orthogonal: byzantine fault-tolerance
- Precisely auto-diagnose failure root causes
- Build the world's fastest email service
 - willing to sacrifice performance for effective repair

Ninja details

Framework for clusterbased Internet services

- SPMC programming model
- built-in mechanisms
 - » clone groups (virtual nodes)
 - » partitions
 - » FE connection manager
 - » asynchronous comm. layer
- built-in services
 - » distributed hash table
 - » streaming, txnal file system
- size: ~20,000 lines of code
 - » NinjaMail: ~3,000
 - » file system: ~5,000
 - » hash table: ~12,000



Context: repair-centric design

- The philosophy of repair-centric design is rarely seen
 - mostly found in "restartable systems"
 - » Recursive Restartability repairs Heisenbugs via reboot
 - » soft-state designs (TACC, Ninja, some production services) tolerate coding errors by restarting errant workers
 - our approach is much broader and adds human focus
 - » almost no work in systems and fault-tolerance community on tolerating human error
 - » UI work minimizes human errors, but cannot prevent entirely

• Some repair-centric mechanisms more common

- but not in service to repair-centric philosophy
- unique: maintenance undo, proactive verification via online fault-injection