



RECOVERY-ORIENTED COMPUTING

## Towards a theory of Undo

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### Outline

- Recap of Undo: motivation and the 3 R's
- First implementation attempt & lessons learned
- Towards a theory for undo
  - foundation: logging of application-level "verbs"
  - modeling verbs and undo history
  - properties of undo-wrappable systems
- Status and conclusions



### Motivation for undo

- Human error is a major impediment to dependability
  - largest single contributing factor to outages
- Undo is a recovery mechanism well-matched to coping with human (and non-human) error
  - tolerates inevitable errors
  - harnesses hindsight and provides retroactive repair
    ~70% of human errors are immediately self-detected
  - supports trial & error exploration of complex systems
    » allow operators to learn from mistakes



## The 3R undo model

- Undo == time travel for system operators
- Three R's for recovery
  - **Rewind:** roll system state backwards in time
  - **Repair:** change system to prevent failure
    - » e.g., edit history, fix latent error, retry unsuccessful operation, install preventative patch
  - Replay: roll system state forward, replaying end-user interactions lost during rewind
- All three R's are critical
  - rewind enables undo
  - repair lets user/administrator fix problems
  - replay preserves updates, propagates fixes forward



## Challenges in 3R undo model


- External consistency
  - repair may alter state that's previously been seen by an external entity
- Drawing the boundary of undo recovery
  - want to recover content while allowing system state to change
- Providing multiple-granularity undo



## First implementation attempt

• Undo wrapper for open source e-mail store

**3R** Layer





## Lessons learned during 1<sup>st</sup> try

- Undo wrapper is complex and error-prone
  - deciding what to log is a challenge
  - have to anticipate all possible external inconsistencies
  - mechanics of log management & state tracking are ugly
- Ad-hoc approach doesn't work
  - bottom-up design => policy expressed procedurally
    - » hard to reason about, change, debug
  - no framework for making policy decisions
- E-mail protocols are not conducive to undowrapping
  - no GUIDs, incomplete command set, ...



# A theory for undo

#### • Goals:

- framework to reason about external inconsistencies generated by an undo cycle
- framework to reason about correctness of undo implementation
- template for undo-wrappable applications/services
- guide to a more general implementation


#### • Approach:

- model undo system structure and applications
- map example apps (e-mail) onto model
- build implementation following model



### Foundation: undo system structure

- An undoable system consists of:
  - an application with a well-defined, non-procedural user interface (a service)
  - a stable storage layer supporting time travel
    - » snapshots, backups, non-overwriting/log-structured FS
  - an undo wrapper that logs and replays user/operator interactions with the application



# Undo logging

- Logging must capture user intent, not actual state changes
  - software may be buggy => state changes may be wrong
  - repair, history deletions may invalidate physical logs
  - easier to reason about consistency with intentional logs
- Undo system logs at a high semantic level
  - user/operator application-level actions (verbs)
  - higher-level than DBMS logical logging
- Fringe benefit: easy georeplication
  - log shipping of high-level undo logs to remote site(s)
  - undo system provides all mechanisms, including resync
    » and vice versa: georeplicated systems easy to undo?



## Modeling undo logging

- Application-client interface is specified as a set of verbs
  - verbs define actions on logically-named state entities
  - e-mail examples:
    - » deliver, fetch, set flags, delete, refile, create folder, ...
- Operations are instances of verbs
  - reflect actual user/operator interaction
- The undo log is a *history* of operations
  - during repair, the history may be modified
  - and other changes may be made to the system that aren't reflected in the history



## Modeling operations

- Each logged operation is modeled by:
  - a verb specifying the action
  - a set of state entities needed to carry out the action
    - a set of preconditions over the state entities
      - » if satisfied, operation will produce same results as previous execution

#### Sused to classify operation as safe or unsafe

- an indication of which state is modified
- an indication of which state is externalized
- a time specifying when results are externalized
  » allows for delayed responses and "undo windows"

> used to determine if unsafe state is externalized



## **Operations & external inconsistency**

- An operation is *safe* upon replay iff:
  - the operation existed, unmodified, in the pre-repair history
  - all associated state entities exist
  - all preconditions are met
  - informally, the operation can execute and produces the same results as the original execution
- Unsafe operations represent potential external inconsistencies
  - but only if the modified (unsafe) state is externalized later in the history
    - » determined by following dependencies in history



# **Classifying histories**

- A history is *replay-safe* if:
  - it contains only safe operations, OR
  - no unsafe operation modifies state that is externalized by a later operation in the history
  - these histories cause no visible inconsistencies
  - all pre-repair histories are replay-safe
- A history is *replay-acceptable* if:
  - it contains unsafe or deleted operations
  - the history can be made replay-safe by inserting appropriate compensating actions
  - these histories have acceptable visible inconsistency
- Undo requires replay-acceptable histories!



## Making histories replay-acceptable

- Step 1: identify unsafe operations
  - check preconditions and existence of needed state
  - done dynamically during replay
- Step 2: insert compensating actions
  - compensations are inherently application-specific
  - explanatory compensations explain unsafe operations to user
    - » ex: "this message was deleted because it had a virus"
  - repairing compensations alter state to reestablish preconditions
    - » ex: create "lost&found" to stand in for nonexistent or read-only e-mail folder



## Example e-mail scenario

#### • Before undo:

- virus-laden message arrives
- user copies it into a folder without looking at it
- $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$  Operator invokes undo to install virus filter
- During replay:
  - message is redelivered and discarded by virus filter
  - copy operation is unsafe
    » violated precondition: existence of source messsage
  - copy operation externalizes existence of message
    » history is replay-unsafe
  - compensating action: insert placeholder for message
    » now copy can be executed; history is replay-acceptable



## Guaranteeing replay-acceptability

- A dependable undo system must be able to make any history replay-acceptable
  - operation templates (verbs) must be specified correctly
    - » all needed preconditions and no extraneous ones
  - compensations must exist for all precondition violations
    - » explicit compensations or dummy compensations that allow the inconsistency to pass through
  - precondition and compensation logic must be correct
    » model identifies cases for exhaustive testing



### Recap: model benefits

- Simplifies reasoning about undo inconsistency
  - expressed in terms of preconditions & compensations
- Provides greater confidence in undo
  - by construction, if preconditions are correct and compensations exist, all scenarios will produce acceptable external consistency
  - declarative specifications of verbs, preconditions, and compensations are easier to write and check
  - model provides guidance for exhaustive testing
- Provides framework for general implementation
  - can separate app-specific policy from undo mechanisms
- Implicitly defines properties of applications
  that can be wrapped for undo

## **Implications for applications**

- Model induces a set of properties for undowrappable applications
  - a high-level, verb-structured interface/API for user, operator, and external actions
  - a state model where all state is nameable via the API and tagged with GUIDs
  - a "complete" API where each an inverse for each verb exists or can be constructed
  - external consistency semantics that permit compensation for non-commuting or non-replayable verbs



## **Implications for applications**

#### Model induces a set of properties for undowrappable applications

- + a high-level, verb-structured interface/API for user, operator, and external actions
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- a "complete" API where each an inverse for each verb exists or can be constructed
- + external consistency semantics that permit compensation for non-commuting or non-replayable verbs
- Example: IMAP/SMTP-based e-mail



### Possible future benefits

#### Automated consistency analysis

- model allows identification of non-replay-safe histories
  - » as described, cannot be done statically since preconditions are dynamic
- model could be extended to pre-compute expected inconsistencies before executing repair/replay
  - » "what-if" analysis of repair impact
  - » requires expanding verb definitions with specification of expected state changes
- given buggy software and arbitrary repairs, automated analysis would be just a hint
  - would provide "best-case" answer assuming perfect SW
    could compare with dynamic analysis to identify bugs?



#### Status and conclusions

#### • Status

- continuing model development using e-mail as driver
  » next step: try to better formalize compensations
- restarting implementation to follow the model
  - » declarative specification of verbs and a general mechanism layer

#### Conclusions

 model-based approach to undo provides needed framework for reasoning about undo behavior
 » simplifies specification of application policy
 » enhances confidence in implementation
 » may lead to automated "what-if" consistency analysis



### Properties of operations

- Two operations  $O_1$  and  $O_2$  commute if:
  - $\mathcal{O}_1$  and  $\mathcal{O}_2$  have disjoint state sets, OR
  - state modified by  $\mathcal{O}_1$  is not part of  $\mathcal{O}_2$ 's state set, OR
  - $O'_1$ 's modifications to common state do not violate  $O'_2$ 's preconditions and are not externalized by  $O_2$
  - essentially,  $\mathcal{O}_2$  isn't affected by changes to  $\mathcal{O}_1$
- An operation is *replayable* if:
  - all needed state exists at replay time
  - all preconditions are satisfied at replay time
  - the operation succeeded, or, if it failed, the time between failure and replay is less than the delay

